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Research
Knowledge and Language
Volume III: Metaphor and Knowledge / Volume I From Orwell’s Problem to Plato’s Problem
herausgegeben von E. Reuland und W. AbrahamVolume I
Studying the relation between knowledge and language, one may distinguish two different lines of inquiry, one focusing on language as a body of knowledge, the other on language as a vehicle of knowledge.
Approaching language as a body of knowledge one faces questions concerning its structure, and the relation with other types of knowledge. One will ask, then, how language is acquired and to what extent the acquisition of language and the structure of the language faculty model relate to aspects of other cognitive capacities. If language is approached as a vehicle for knowledge, the question arises what enables linguistic entities to represent facts about the world? To what extent does this rely on conventional aspects of meanings? Is it possible for language, when used non-conventionally as in metaphors, to convey intersubjective knowledge? If so (and it does seem to be the case), one may wonder what makes this possible. This book investigates the role of conceptual structure in cognitive processes, exploring it from the perspectives of philosophy of language, linguistics, political philosophy, psychology, literary theory, aesthetics, and philosophy of science.
Volume II
Studying the relation between knowledge and language, one may distinguish two different lines of inquiry, one focusing on language as a body of knowledge, the other on language as a vehicle of knowledge.
Approaching language as a body of knowledge one faces questions concerning its structure, and the relation with other types of knowledge. One will ask, then, how language is acquired and to what extent the acquisition of language and the structure of the language faculty model relate to aspects of other cognitive capacities. If language is approached as a vehicle for knowledge, the question arises what enables linguistic entities to represent facts about the world? To what extent does this rely on conventional aspects of meanings? Is it possible for language, when used non-conventionally as in metaphors, to convey intersubjective knowledge? If so (and it does seem to be the case), one may wonder what makes this possible. This book investigates the role of conceptual structure in cognitive processes, exploring it from the perspectives of philosophy of language, linguistics, political philosophy, psychology, literary theory, aesthetics, and philosophy of science.
Volume II
