Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources

Inhaltsverzeichnis

• Editor’s Introduction.
• 1: International Dimensions.
• 1 International Environmental Agreements as Games.
• 1. Introduction.
• 2. Reaching agreement.
• 2.1. Identical countries.
• 2.2. Cost differences.
• 2.3. Benefit differences.
• 2.4. Choice of a benchmark.
• 2.5. Summary.
• 3. Sustaining agreement.
• References.
• Comments by Henk Folmer.
• 2 Emission Taxes in a Dynamic International Game of CO2 Emissions.
• 2. A static game.
• 3. A dynamic game.
• 4. The open loop equilibrium without taxes.
• 5. The Markov perfect equilibrium without taxes.
• 6. Other subgame perfect equilibria.
• 7. Pigouvian taxes.
• 8. Non-commitment and taxation.
• Comments by Otto Keck.
• 3 Critical Loads and International Environmental Cooperation.
• 1. Critical loads.
• 2. Naive interpretations.
• 3. Stock of pollutants — the case of one country.
• 4. Stock of pollutants — several countries and the open loop equilibrium.
• 5. Closed loop or feed back equilibria.
• Comments by Henry Tulkens.
• 4 Environmental Conflicts and Strategic Commitment.
• 2. Analytical framework.
• 3. Asymmetric players and endogenous strategic timing.
• 4. N players and strategic team formation.
• 5. Conclusion.
• Comments by Detlev Homann.
• 5 The Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments and Strategic International Trade.
• 2. The model.
• 3. Single stage Cournot model.
• 4. Two stage Stackelberg model.
• 5. Two stage Cournot model.
• 6. Conclusions.
• Comments by Marji Lines.
• 6 Economic Models of Optimal Energy Use under Global Environmental Constraints.
• 1: The CO2 Problem in Basic Models of Optimal Use of Fossil Fuels.
• 2. Background problem on climatic change and global environmental constraints.
• 3. Economic studies on the CO2 problem.
• 4. Preliminary definitions and the general model.
• 5. A simplified model.
• 5.1. Necessary conditions.
• 5.2. Sufficient conditions.
• 5.3. Definition and optimality of equilibrium.
• 5.4. Illustration by a phase plane diagram.
• 6. A discrete type impact of CO2 emissions.
• 7. Further specification of the model.
• 8. Discussion.
• 2: Technical Change, International Co-operation, and Structural Uncertainty.
• 10. A taxonomy of technical change.
• 11. Neutral technical change in a general model.
• 12. International co-operation.
• 13. Structural uncertainty.
• 13.1. Modelling uncertainty about critical CO2 levels as uncertainty about a critical, limited natural resource.
• 13.2. Treating structural uncertainty.
• 13.3. Numerical calculations.
• 14. Conclusions and perspectives.
• Appendix A: Existence and Uniqueness of the Optimal Solution.
• Appendix B: Existence and Stability of Equilibrium.
• Comments by Oskar Von Dem Hagen.
• Comments by Cees Withagen.
• 2: Monitoring and Enforcement.
• 7 Monitoring and Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws in Europe and the United States.
• 2. Differences among monitoring and enforcement problems and systems.
• 3. Key dimensions of monitoring and enforcement systems.
• 3.1. Probability of monitoring.
• 3.2. Surprise.
• 3.3. Definition of a violation.
• 3.4. Penalties and other responses to violations.
• 4. Some evidence on European & U. S. choices in monitoring & enforcement.
• 5. A glimpse of the future? Recommendations from the U. K. (The “Kinnersley Report”).
• 6. Concluding comments.
• Comments by Heinz Welsch.
• 8 The Economics of Negotiations on Water Quality — An Application of Principal Agent Theory.
• 2. The basic model structure of a modified LEN-model.
• 3. The basic model with a beta—distribution of water quality depending on abatement intensity.
• 4. Possible extensions.
• Comments by Günther knieps.
• 9 Monitoring the Emission of Pollutants by Means of the Inspector Leadership Method.
• 1. Monitoring point sources of pollution.
• 2. Decision theoretical formulation of the problem.
• 3. Comparison of the solutions of the simple’ simultaneous’ and ‘leadership’ games.
• 4. The general inspector leadership game and the Neyman —Pearson lemma.
• 5. Application.
• 6. Concluding remarks.
• Comments by Till Requate.
• 10 Illegal Pollution and Monitoring of Unknown Quality — A Signaling Game Approach —.
• 1: Equilibrium Scenarios with Pooling and Signaling Behavior.
• 2. The game model.
• 3. A gallery of equilibrium scenarios.
• 3.1. Pooled shirking and illegal waste disposal: ‘polluter’s paradise scenario’.
• 3.2. Exploratory accidents and illegal waste disposal due to unqualified control: ‘signaling scenarios’.
• 3.3. Absence of illegal pollution due to efficient control: ‘controller’s paradise scenario’.
• 3.4. Intermediate illegal pollution: ‘constrained polluter’s paradise scenario’.
• 3.5. Equilibrium scenarios and the multiplicity of equilibria.
• 2: Perfect Equilibria and (Unique) Solutions via Equilibrium Selection.
• 4. Uniformly perfect pure strategy equilibria.
• 5. Comparison of signaling and pooling equilibria.
• 5.1. Cell and truncation consistency.
• 5.2. Payoff dominance.
• 5.3. Risk dominance.
• 5.4. Solutions in the range (4.14).
• 5.5. The solution in the range (4.15).
• 5.6. Discussion of the solution.
• Comments by Aart de Zeeuw.