Science in Flux

Inhaltsverzeichnis

• 1. A Prologue: On Stability and Flux.
• References.
• 2. Science in Flux: Footnotes to Popper.
• I. Einstein has Upset the View that Science is Stable.
• II. The Empirical Support of Some Scientific Theories Requires Explanation.
• III. The Desire for Stability Makes Us See More of It than There is.
• IV. Popper’s Theory Presents Science as an Endless Series of Debates.
• V. Popper Makes Additional Assumptions.
• VI. Rationality is a Means to an End.
• Appendix: The Role of Corroboration in Popper’s Philosophy.
• Notes.
• 3. On Novelty.
• I. On the Novelty of Ideas in General.
• II. Science and Truth.
• III. Popper’s View of Science.
• Appendix: On the Discovery of General Facts.
• 4. Replies To Diane: Popper On Learning From Experience81.
• Note.
• Appendix: Empiricism Without Inductivism.
• 5. Sensationalism.
• 1. Sensationalism vs. Theoretical Knowledge.
• 2. Sensationalism vs. Empiricism.
• 3. Sense-Experience vs. Experience.
• 4. Sensationalism vs. Common Sense.
• 5. Explanation vs. Consent.
• 6. The Roots of Scientific Realism.
• 7. Conclusion.
• 6. When Should we Ignore Evidence in Favour of a Hypothesis?.
• I. Can Observation Reports be Revoked?.
• II. Can Refutation be Final?.
• III. A Simple Issue Obfuscated.
• IV. A Criterion for Rejection of Observation Reports?.
• V. Does Popper Offer a Rule of Rejection?.
• VI. Do We Need a Rate of Acceptance of Observation Reports?.
• Appendix: Random Versus Unsystematic Observations.
• 7. Testing as a Bootstrap Operation in Physics.
• First Introduction: Reliability is not a Matter for Pure Science.
• Second Introduction: The Duhem-Quine Thesis has a New Significance.
• I. Conventionalists and the Problem of Induction.
• II. Popper is Ambivalent Regarding Goodman’s Problem.
• III. Bootstrap Operations in Testing.
• IV. The Need forConstraints is Quite Real.
• V. Science Constraints Itself by Auxiliary Hypotheses.
• VI. Revolutions Occur when Bootstrap Operations Fail.
• VII. Conclusion.
• Appendix: Precision in Theory and in Measurement.
• 8. Towards A Theory Of ‘Ad Hoc’ Hypotheses.
• I. Ad hoc Hypotheses which become Factual Evidence.
• II. The Conventional Element in Science.
• III. Reducing the Conventions.
• IV. Metaphysics and ad hoc Hypotheses.
• V. What is a Mess?.
• Appendix: The Traditional ad hoc Use of Instrumentalism.
• 9. The Nature of Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics.
• I. Scientific Research Centers Around a Few Problems.
• II. The Anti-Metaphysical Tradition is Outdated.
• III. A Historical Note on Science and Metaphysics.
• IV. Pseudo-Science is not the Same as Non-Science.
• V. Popper’s Theory of Science.
• VI. Superstition, Pseudo-Science, and Metaphysics Use Instances in Different Ways.
• VII. Metaphysical Doctrines are Often Insufficient Frame-works for Science.
• VIII. The Role of Interpretations in Physics.
• IX. The History of Science as the History of Its Metaphysical Frameworks.
• Appendix: What is a Natural Law?.
• 10. Questions of Science and Metaphysics.
• I. How Do we Select Questions?.
• II. We Select Questions Within Given Metaphysical Frame-works.
• III. The Literature on Questions.
• IV. The Literature on the Logic of Questions.
• V. The Instrumentalist View on the Choice of Questions.
• VI. Collingwood’s Peculiarity.
• VII. The Logic of Multiple-Choice-Questions.
• VIII. Bromberger on Why-Questions.
• IX. The Need for a Metaphysical Theory of Causality.
• X. Collingwood in a New Garb.
• Appendix: The Anti-Scientific Metaphysician.
• 11. The Confusion Between Physics And Metaphysics in the Standard Histories of Sciences.
• Appendix: Reply to Commentators.
• 12. TheConfusion Between Science and Technology in the Standard Philosophies of Science.
• Appendix: Planning for Success: A Reply to Professor Wisdom.
• 13. Positive Evidence in Science and Technology.
• I. Kant’s Scandal.
• II. Whitehead’s Scandal.
• III. The Facts About Induction.
• IV. Success and Rationality.
• V. The Sociology of Knowledge.
• Appendix: Duhem’s Instrumentalism and Autonomism.
• 14. Positive Evidence as a Social Institution.
• Appendix: The Logic of Technological Development.
• 15. Imperfect Knowledge.
• I. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Science is Questionable.
• II. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Rational Belief is an Error.
• III. Imperfect Knowledge-Claims are Qualified by Publicly Accepted Hypotheses.
• 16. Criteria for Plausible Arguments.
• Appendix: The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepticism.
• 17. Modified Conventionalism.
• I. The Problem.
• II. Science and Society.
• III. Popper’s Problems of Demarcation.
• IV. The Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge Revisited.
• Appendix: Bartley’s Critique of Popper.
• 18. Unity and Diversity in Science.
• Abstract.
• I. Ambivalence Towards Unity: An Impression.
• II. The Ethics of Science as a Unifier of Science.
• III. Proof as the Unifier of Science.
• IV. Manifest Truth as the Unifier of Science.
• V. Unity of Science as a Dictator of Unanimity on All Questions.
• VI. A Theory of Rational Disagreement.
• Appendix on Kant.
• 19. Can Religion go Beyond Reason?.
• I. Religion and Reason.
• II. Dissatisfaction with Science and Religion.
• III. Reason and Faith.
• IV. The Question of Complementary Relationship.
• V. Toward Intellectual Complementation.
• VI. Possibilities of Cooperation.
• VII. Defects of Both Rationalism and Religion.
• VIII. Standards of Rational Thought and Action.
• IX. Enlightenment and Self-Reliance.
• X. The Sophisticated Religionists: Buber and Polangi.
• XI. Science and Universalistic Religion.
• Appendix on Buber.
• 20. Assurance and Agnosticism.
• I. The Compleat Agnostic.
• II. The Image of Inductive Science.
• III. Empirical Facts About Assurance.
• IV. The Non-Justificationist Mood.
• V. Conversion to Autonomism.
• VI. The Assured Agnostic.
• Index of Works Cited.
• Index of Names.
• Index of Subjects.