Husserl and Intentionality

Inhaltsverzeichnis

• Analytical Table of Contents.
• I/Intentionality and Intensionality.
• 1. The Intentionality of Acts of Consciousness.
• 1.1. Intentionality.
• 1.2. “Acts” of Consciousness.
• 1.3. The Objects of Acts.
• 1.4. Direct-Object Acts versus Propositional Acts.
• 1.5. Propositional Acts and Intending “About” Something.
• 2. Some Main Characteristics of “Intentional Relations”.
• 2.1. “Intentional Relations”.
• 2.2. The Existence-Independence of Intentional Relations.
• 2.3. The Conception-Dependence of Intentional Relations.
• 2.4. Conception-Dependence and the Individuation of Intentions.
• 2.5. The “Indeterminacy” in Intentions of Transcendent Objects.
• 2.6. Definite and Indefinite Intentions.
• 3. The Intensionality of Act-Contexts.
• 3.1. Intensionality.
• 3.2. The Failure of Substitutivity of Identity for Act-Contexts.
• 3.3. Failure of Existential Generalization for Act-Contexts, Case 1: Failure of Existence.
• 3.4. Failure of Existential Generalization for Act-Contexts, Case 2: Indefiniteness.
• 3.5. “De Dicto” and “De Re” Modalities.
• 4. Intensionality vis-à-vis Intentionality.
• II/Some Classical Approaches to the Problems of Intentionality and Intensionality.
• 1. Theories of Intentionality as Theories About the Objects of Intention.
• 1.1. The Object-Approach to Intentionality.
• 1.2. “Intentional Objects”.
• 1.3. Ambiguities in the Notion of “Intentional Object”.
• 2. Object-Theories of Intentionality.
• 2.1. Mind-Dependent Entities as Objects of Intention: An Interpretation of Brentano’s Early Theory.
• 2.2. Problems with Mind-Dependent Entities as Objects of Intention.
• 2.3. Intentional Objects as “Objects Beyond Being”: Meinong’s Theory of Objects.
• 2.4. Intentional Objects as “Fictions”: Brentano’s Later Theory.
• 3. Frege’s Approach to Meaning, Reference, and the Problems of Intensionality.
• 3.1. Parallels Between Frege’s Semantics of Act-Sentences and the Object- Approach to Intentionality.
• 3.2. Frege’s Theory of Meaning and Reference.
• 3.3. Meanings as Abstract “Intensional Entities”.
• 3.4. Frege’s Semantics for Sentences of Propositional Attitude.
• 3.5. Intensional Entities in Intentionality: Objects or Mediators of Intention?.
• III/Fundamentals of Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality.
• 1. Husserl’s Phenomenological Approach to Intentionality.
• 1.1. Husserl’s Conception of Intentionality.
• 1.2. Husserlian Phenomenology and Phenomenological Method.
• 1.3. Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Intentionality.
• 2. “Phenomenological Content”.
• 2.1. Act, Content, and Object: Twardowski’s Formulation of the Distinction.
• 2.2. Husserl’s Conception of Content in Logical Investigations.
• 2.3. Husserl’s Mature Conception of Content: Noesis and Noema.
• 2.4. The Structure of an Act’s Noema: its “Sinn” and “Thetic” components.
• 2.5. Content, Noesis, and Noema in Review.
• 2.6. The Content of Perception: its Sensory (or Hyletic) and Noetic Phases.
• 3. Husserl’s Basic Theory: Intention via Sinn.
• 3.1. Noematic Sinne as Mediators.
• 3.2. The Theory and Its Account of the Peculiarities of Intention.
• IV/Husserl’s Theory of Noematic Sinn.
• 1. Interpreting Noematic Sinn.
• 1.1. Noema as Content and as Meaning.
• 1.2. What is the “Intended as Such”?.
• 1.3. Sinne versus Meinongian “Incomplete” Objects.
• 1.4. Noema versus Essence.
• 2. Husserl’s Identification of Linguistic Meaning and Noematic Sinn.
• 2.1. Husserl’s Conception of Linguistic Meaning.
• 2.2. Husserl on Meaning and Reference.
• 2.3. Every Linguistic Meaning is a Noematic Sinn.
• 2.4. Every Noematic Sinn is Expressible as a Linguistic Meaning.
• 2.5. Qualifications and Extensions of the Expressibility Thesis.
• 2.6. Noematic Description.
• 2.7. Noemata as a Kind of Propositions (Sätze).
• 3. How Is Intention Achieved via Sinn?.
• 3.1. Husserl’s Account of the Structure of a Noematic Sinn: the “X” and the “Predicate-Senses”.
• 3.2. Some Problems for a “Definite-Description” Model of Intentionality.
• 3.3. The Problem of Definite, or De Re, Intentions.
• 3.4. The Sinn of Perception as “Demonstrative”.
• 3.5. Intentionality and Pragmatics: Contextual Influences on Intention.
• V/Husserl’s Notion of Horizon.
• 1. Meaning and Possible Experience: The Turn to Husserl’s Notion of Horizon.
• 1.1. The “Indeterminacy” in Intentions of Transcendent Objects.
• 1.2. Husserl’s Notions of Object-Horizon, Act-Horizon, and Manifold.
• 1.3. Horizon-Analysis as a New Method of Phenomenological Analysis.
• 2. Husserl’s Conception of Horizon.
• 2.1. Early Notions of Object-Horizon: Ideas (1913).
• 2.2. The Horizon of Possible Experiences Associated with an Act: Cartesian Meditations (1931).
• 2.3. Act-Horizon and Object-Horizon.
• 2.4. The Central Role of Perception in Horizon.
• 2.5. The Maximal Horizon of an Act: An Act’s Manifold of Associated Possible Acts.
• 3. Horizon and Background Beliefs.
• 3.1. The “Predelineation” of an Act’s Horizon.
• 3.2. Horizon and Fundamental Background Beliefs.
• 3.3. Horizon and Concrete Background Beliefs; Background Meaning.
• 3.4. Counter-Evidence within an Act’s Horizon.
• 4. The Structure of an Act’s Horizon 25.
• 4.1. Internal and External Horizon.
• 4.2. Temporal Structure in the Horizon.
• 4.3. The Horizon’s Breakdown into Verification Chains.
• 4.4. Synthesis of Identification Within the Horizon.
• 4.5. Summary of Husserl’s Account of Horizon-Structure.
• 5. Toward a Generalized Theory of Horizon.
• VI/Horizon-Analysis and the Possible-Worlds Explication of Meaning.
• 1. Horizon-Analysis as Explication of Sinn and Intention.
• 1.1. Horizon-Analysis and the Verification Theory of Meaning.
• 1.2. Horizon-Analysis and the Carnapian, or Possible-Worlds, Theory of Meaning.
• 1.3. Sorting Husserl with the Carnapian.
• 1.4. Horizon-Analysis as “Pragmatic” Explication of Intention.
• 1.5. Husserl’s Appraisal of Horizon-Analysis Revisited.
• 1.6. The Significance of Horizon-Analysis: Beyond Frege to New Horizons.
• 2. The Explication of Meaning in Terms of Possible Worlds.
• 2.1. Intension and Extension.
• 2.2. Intension and Comprehension.
• 2.3. Intensions as Functions on Possible Worlds.
• 2.4. Intensions as Functions: Explication versus Definition.
• 2.5. Two Kinds of Intensional Entities and Their Explication.
• 2.6. “Individual Concepts”, or Individual Meanings.
• 2.7. Rigid and Individuating Meanings.
• 2.8. The Explication of Noematic Sinn in Terms of Possible Worlds.
• 2.9. “Pragmatic” Explication of Intention in Terms of Possible Worlds.
• 3. The Basis in Husserl for a Possible-Worlds Explication of Meaning and Intention.
• 3.1. Possible Objects and Possible Worlds in Husserl.
• 3.2. The Equivalence of Horizon-Analysis and Possible-Worlds Explication of Sinn and Intention.
• 3.3. The Eliminability of Possible Entities from Husserl’s Theory of Horizon.
• VII/Intentionality and Possible-Worlds Semantics.
• 1. Intentionality in Possible-Worlds Theory.
• 1.1. Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality With and Without Possible Worlds.
• 1.2. The “Husserlian” Possible-Worlds Theory of Intentionality.
• 1.3. The Pure Possible-Worlds Theory of Intentionality.
• 1.4. The Possible-Worlds Approach to Intentionality.
• 2. Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.
• 2.1. Fregean, Tarskian, and Possible-Worlds Semantics.
• 2.2. Hintikka’s Possible-Worlds Approach to Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.
• 2.3. The Account of Intensionality in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.
• 2.4. Meaning Entities in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.
• 2.5. Background Beliefs in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.
• 3. Intentionality in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.
• 3.1. Object and Content of Belief.
• 3.2. The Aboutness of Indefinite, or De Dicto, Belief.
• 3.3. The Aboutness of Definite, or De Re, Belief.
• 3.4. Existence-Independence and Conception-Dependence of Aboutness.
• 3.5. States of Affairs as Objects of Belief.
• 4. A Husserlian Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.
• VIII/Definite, or De Re, Intention in a Husserlian Framework.
• 1. The Characterization of Definite, or De Re, Intention.
• 1.1. Modes of Definite Intention.
• 1.2. Must the Object of a Definite Intention Exist?.
• 1.3. Expressing and Describing Definite Intentions: Proper Names, Demonstrative Pronouns, and Quantifying-In.
• 1.4. The Explication of Definite Intention in Terms of Horizon and Possible Worlds.
• 2. Perceptual Acquaintance.
• 2.1. The “Demonstrative” Acquainting Sense in Perception.
• 2.2. The Explication of Perceptual Acquaintance in Terms of Possible Worlds.
• 3. Identity, Individuation, and Individuation in Consciousness.
• 3.1. Concerning Identity and Individuation.
• 3.2. The Identity of a Natural Individual and Its “Transcendence”.
• 3.3. Husserl on Individuation Through Time.
• 3.4. Husserl on Trans-World Individuation.
• 4. Toward a Phenomenological Account of Individuative Consciousness.
• 4.1. The Phenomenological Structure of Individuative Intention: Toward a “Pragmatic” Analysis of Individuative Definiteness.
• 4.2. Knowing-Who and Individuative Consciousness.
• 4.3. A Closer Look at the Structure of Individuative Intention.