Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect

Inhaltsverzeichnis

• 1 Introduction and Conclusions.
• 2 Literature Review.
• 2.1 Introduction.
• 2.2 The Greenhouse Effect.
• 2.3 Environmental Resource Models.
• 2.4 The International Dimension.
• 2.5 Summary and Conclusion.
• 3 Sustainability, Emission Reduction Technology and Human Capital.
• 3.1 Introduction.
• 3.2 The Rudimentary Model.
• 3.3 Energy Related Capital.
• 3.4 Human Capital Accumulation.
• 3.5 Summary and Conclusions.
• 4 Multi Country Modelling of the Greenhouse Effect.
• 4.1 Introduction.
• 4.2 Differential Game Theory.
• 4.3 Energy-Related Capital in a Multi-Country Model.
• 4.4 Self-Enforcing International Cooperation.
• 4.5 Renegotiation Proofness.
• 4.6 Summary and Conclusions.
• 5 Cooperation in a Second-Best World: Technology Transfers and Issue Linkage.
• 5.1 Introduction.
• 5.2 International Cooperation and Technology Transfers.
• 5.3 Issue Linkage in International Environmental Problems.
• 5.4 Summary and Conclusions.
• A.
• A. l Local Stability Analysis for Section 3.3.1.
• A.2 Local Stability Analysis for Section 3.4.1.
• B.
• B. l Routine to Calculate Riccati Coefficients.
• B.2 Example Worked Out.
• B.3 Linear-Quadratic Case Worked Out.
• B.4 Open-Loop Case.
• B.5 Closed-Loop Case.
• B.6 ParetoCase.
• B.7 Comparison of the Open-loop, Feedback and Cooperative Case.
• B.8 Renegotiation Proofness.
• B.9 Specification of the Discrete Time Example.
• C.
• C. l Description of Feedback Solution.
• C.2 Proof of Theorems on Linkage.
• Literature.
• List of Figures.
• List of Tables.