Resource Extraction and Market Structure von Martin Schäfer | ISBN 9783642489228

Resource Extraction and Market Structure

von Martin Schäfer
Buchcover Resource Extraction and Market Structure | Martin Schäfer | EAN 9783642489228 | ISBN 3-642-48922-2 | ISBN 978-3-642-48922-8

Resource Extraction and Market Structure

von Martin Schäfer

Inhaltsverzeichnis

  • I Dynamic Models of Resource Extraction in Markets of Monopoly or Pure Competition with Full Information.
  • 1. Hotelling’s Model.
  • 2. Optimal Extraction Rates and Exploration.
  • 2.1 Pure Competition.
  • 2.2 Monopoly.
  • 3. Optimal Extraction Rates and Constant Elasticity of Demand.
  • 4. Market Structure and Optimal Depletion Rates.
  • 4.1 Pure Competition.
  • 4.2 Monopoly.
  • 5. Extraction of an Exhaustible Resource and Production of a Substitute.
  • 5.1 Social Optimum.
  • 5.2 Extraction of the Resource and Production of the Substitute by the same Monopoly.
  • 5.3 Many Owners of the Resource and Production of the Substitute by Monopoly.
  • 5.4 Many Owners of the Resource and Production of the Substitute by all.
  • 6. Extraction of Durable Exhaustible Resources.
  • 6.1 Discrete Time.
  • 6.2 Continuous Time.
  • 6.2.1 Pure Competition.
  • 6.2.2 Monopoly.
  • 7. Conclusions.
  • II Dynamic Models with Uncertainty and Monopolistic Markets or Pure Competition.
  • 1. Optimal Extraction Rates and Uncertainty with Respect to R& D towards Future Technologies.
  • 1.1 Exogenous Technical Progress.
  • 1.1.1 Basic Model.
  • 1.1.2 First Extension: Production.
  • 1.1.3 Second Extension: Exhaustible Resources.
  • 1.1.4 Third Extension: Uncertainty about the Future Technological Development.
  • 1.2 Endogenous Technical Progress.
  • 1.2.1 Basic Model.
  • 1.2.2 Modification of the Basic Model.
  • 1.2.3 Example with Exponentially Distributed Z.
  • 2. Optimal Extraction Rates and Unknown Reserves.
  • 2.1 Monopolistic Extraction Rates Depending on Time only.
  • 2.2 Monopolistic Extraction Rates Depending on Time and Quantities already Extracted.
  • 2.3 Optimal Extraction Rates and Pure Competition.
  • 2.3.1 Basic Model.
  • 2.3.2 Example with Two Suppliers.
  • 2.4 Optimal Extraction Rates from Consumer’s View.
  • 2.4.1 Basic Model.
  • 2.4.2 Example withExponentially Distributed Z.
  • 2.5 Pure Competition and Optimal Extraction.
  • 3. Optimal Extraction Rates and Unknown Costs of the Development of a Substitute.
  • 3.1 One-period Analysis and Monopoly.
  • 3.2 One-period Analysis and Pure Competition.
  • 3.3 Two-period Analysis.
  • 3.3.1 Optimal Extraction and One Decision Maker.
  • 3.3.1.1 Basic Model.
  • 3.3.1.2 Example with Linear Demand.
  • 3.3.2 Optimal Extraction and Pure Competition.
  • 3.3.3 Extraction of the Resource and Production of the Substitute by Exactly One Monopoly.
  • 4. Conclusions.
  • III Short Introduction to the Theory of Differential Games.
  • IV Dynamic Models of Resource Extraction and Duopolistic Markets.
  • 1. An Introductory Duopoly Model with Production Strategies.
  • 2. Duopoly with Price Strategies and Exploration.
  • 2.1 Open-loop Controls.
  • 2.2 Closed-loop Controls.
  • 3. A Duopoly Model with Quantity Strategies.
  • 3.1 Introduction of the Model.
  • 3.2 Specialization of the Model: Linear-Quadratic Differential Game.
  • 4. Cartelization and Optimal Extraction of Exhaustible Resources.
  • 4.2 Monopolistic Behaviour of the Cartel.
  • 4.3 Implications of Cartelization to the Profits of the Non-Cartel.
  • 5. Oligopoly with Discrete Time Parameter.
  • 6. Conclusions.
  • V Oligopolistic Extraction with Continuous Time.
  • 1. Basic Model with Quantity Strategies.
  • 1.1 Introduction of the Model.
  • 1.2 Algorithm for the Determination of a Nash Equilibrium.
  • 2. Specializations of the Basic Model.
  • 2.1 Fixed Resource Stock.
  • 2.2 Deterministic Expandable Resource Stocks.
  • 3. Oligopoly and Price Strategies.