Buchcover The Metaphysics of Science | Craig Dilworth | EAN 9789401586214 | ISBN 94-015-8621-7 | ISBN 978-94-015-8621-4

From the reviews:

"Dilworth does not content himself with a mere philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of modern science, but tries to draw a lesson from the analysis applicable to the actual practice of science. Whereas in its beginnings modern science was a paradigm of open-mindedness, it is now in danger of becomming an ideology, due to its refusal to reflect on its own principles. The Metaphysics of Science performs the much-needed function of opening the doors to such reflection - both for professional philosophers and scientists themselves''. (L. E. Fleischhacker, Epistemologia)

From the reviews of the second edition:

„All scientific and technological disciplines deal with systems; all systems’ research have a philosophy; all philosophies have numerous meta-components comprising meta-subdisciplines and meta-topics. … Inasmuch as I strongly believe that every scientist (among many others) ought to know basic general and their specific-profession-related specialized philosophy, naturally with embedded mate-disciplines and meta-topics, Dilworth’s book is recommended.“ (Karl H. Wolf, International Journal of General Systems, Vol. 36 (5), 2007)

„Science makes metaphysical presuppositions. I must … at once declare an interest. … According to Dilworth, the three metaphysical principles constitute ‘the core of modern science’ … . They guide research and provide methodological rules. … Dilworth suggests that we need a new metaphysical paradigm for a new kind of science. … this book propounds an immensely important idea–even if one that received a much improved formulation at least twelve years before publication of the first edition.“ (Nicholas Maxwell, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, August, 2009)

The Metaphysics of Science

An Account of Modern Science in terms of Principles, Laws and Theories

von Craig Dilworth

The roots of this work lie in my earlier book, Scientific Progress, which first appeared in 1981. One of its topics, the distinction between scientific laws and theories, is there treated with reference to the same distinction as drawn by N. R. Campbell in his Physics: The Elements. Shortly after completing Scientific Progress, I read Rom Harre's The Principles of Scientific Thinking, in which the concept of theory is even more clearly delineated than in Campbell, being directly con nected to the notion of a model - as it was in my book. In subsequent considerations regarding science, Harre's work thus became my main source of inspiration with regard to theories, while Campbell's re mained my main source with respect to empiricallaws. Around the same time I also read William Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. In this work, Whewell depicts principles as playing a central role in the formation of science, and conceives of them in much the same way as Kant conceives of fundamental syn thetic a priori judgements. The idea that science should have principles as a basic element immediately made sense to me, and from that time I have thought of science in terms of laws, theories and principles.